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1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2009 Green Revolution in Iran has been dubbed the “Twitter 
Revolution” due to the importance of social media in mobilizing 
protesters against a seemingly rigged election.  However, the revo-
lution also illustrated a problem with U.S. sanctions against Iran:  
protestors did not have access to certain information and communi-
cations technology (“ICT”) that had been restricted by sanctions or 
that had not otherwise been made available by companies because 
of perceived risks of doing business in the heavily sanctioned coun-
try.  
Sanctions prohibit the exportation of technological goods and 
services from the United States or by U.S. persons to Iran.1  The U.S. 
Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) 
has issued general licenses since the Green Revolution authorizing 
the exportation of fee and non-fee based technology.2  These licenses 
allow the exportation of services, software, and hardware like mes-
sengers, social media platforms, applications (“apps”), web brows-
ers, phones, and laptops.3  Despite these reforms, there is still great 
uncertainty and ICT companies face tremendous legal, reputational, 
and financial risks.  The recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(“JCPOA”) does little to address these risks, as it does not lift ICT 
sanctions.  As a result, Iranians still do not have access to important 
ICT tools.  This is significant because it impedes Iranian civilians’ 
ability to communicate with one another and mobilize against their 
                                                   
1  Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2015) 
(“[T]he exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the 
United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, tech-
nology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran is prohibited . . . .”).  See also 
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations Involving Sanctions Against 
Iran (Jan 23, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pro-
grams/Documents/iran.pdf (“In general, a person may not export from the U.S. 
any goods, technology or services, if that person knows or has reason to know such 
items are intended specifically for supply, transshipment or reexportation to 
Iran.”). 
2  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License Related to Personal Communication 
Services (2010); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain 
Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (2014). 
3  Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
766 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
 
government, hindering the same freedoms that sanctions are meant 
to protect. 
This comment argues that U.S. sanctions against Iran affecting 
ICT companies have had adverse consequences for both Iranians 
and U.S. foreign policy.  Sanctions have limited the ability of Irani-
ans to access information and communicate.  Resultantly, they have 
not had their intended effect of giving Iranian civilians ICT tools in 
order to support a robust civil society.  U.S. foreign policy interests 
have thus been undermined.  
This comment explores how U.S. sanctions against Iran have af-
fected the ICT sector, what implications this has for Iranians and 
U.S. foreign policy, and how stakeholders can improve the sanctions 
regime and incentivize the ICT sector in a way that promotes both 
Iranians’ freedoms and U.S. foreign policy interests.  Section 2 of this 
paper reviews the sanctions regime imposed by the United States.  
Section 3 looks at the effect of sanctions, including how ICT compa-
nies make decisions when dealing with sanctions, what their re-
sponses have been to the sanctions regime after the U.S. govern-
ment’s easing of sanctions, and the implications that sanctions and 
companies’ responses to sanctions have on Iranians’ freedoms and 
the United States’ stated goals for sanctions.  Section 4 considers ap-
proaches the U.S. government, ICT companies, and civil society 
should take to promote the well-being of Iranians and serve U.S. for-
eign policy goals. 
Since sanctions have had the unintended effect of restricting civil 
society mobilization in Iran, this comment recommends that the U.S. 
government further target sanctions, create more authorizations, 
ease financial restrictions, and increase information transparency.  
This would have the effect of incentivizing companies to export 
technology to Iran and provide these mobilization tools to Iranians.  
The United States should seize this opportunity to improve the sanc-
tions regime by incentivizing companies in a way that promotes Ira-
nians’ freedoms and U.S. foreign policy goals.  
2. U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN AFFECTING ICT COMPANIES  
2.1. Purpose 
U.S. sanctions against Iran are incredibly expansive and com-
plex.  The U.S. government began imposing broad sanctions against 
Iran in response to threats to U.S. national security, foreign policy, 
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and the economy following the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran.4  The purpose of the sanctions regime has evolved over 
time.  The United States continued to impose sanctions after the hos-
tage crisis in the 1980s and 1990s to compel Iran to cease supporting 
terrorist activities.5  In the 2000s and 2010s, sanctions were a re-
sponse to concerns about Iran’s nuclear proliferation program6 and 
human rights violations.7  Based on these foreign policy and national 
                                                   
4  Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (blocking Iranian 
Government property upon finding that “the situation in Iran constitutes an unu-
sual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and econ-
omy”).  See also U.S. Dep’t of State, Iran Sanctions, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) 
(providing an overview of U.S. sanctions against Iran); KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 1 (2015) (detailing the history and objec-
tives of initial sanctions); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ANN 
ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 626–35 
(1st ed. 1985) (chronicling events leading up to U.S. sanctions and U.S. statements 
about sanctions); Patrick Clawson, Iran, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN 
DIPLOMACY 85, 85 (Richard Haass ed., 1998) (describing initial sanctions against Iran 
under the Carter administration). 
5  50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012) (granting authority to the president when there is an 
“unusual and extraordinary threat”).  Note that the original statute was titled the 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and was retitled in 2006 after the Libya sanctions were 
lifted.  Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 3, 110 Stat. 1541, 
1541 (1996) (declaring U.S. policy to “deny Iran the ability to support acts of inter-
national terrorism”).  See also Clawson, supra note 4, at 86–89 (describing sanctions 
against Iran under the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations to combat terror-
ism). 
6  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-195, § 3, 124 Stat. 1312, 1314 (2010) (“[I]nternational diplomatic efforts to 
address Iran's illicit nuclear efforts and support for international terrorism are more 
likely to be effective if strong additional sanctions are imposed on the Government 
of Iran . . . .”); U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 4 (identifying that an aim of sanctions 
is “(1) to block the transfer of weapons, components, technology, and dual-use 
items to Iran’s prohibited nuclear and missile programs; (2) to target select sectors 
of the Iranian economy relevant to its proliferation activities; and (3) to induce Iran 
to engage constructively” with the international community “to fulfill its nonpro-
liferation obligations”).   
7  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
158, § 101, 126 Stat. 1214, 1217 (2012) (“Among the economic measures to be taken 
are . . . . (4) a focus on countering Iran's efforts to evade sanctions, including—(A) 
the activities of telecommunications, Internet, and satellite service providers, in and 
outside of Iran, to ensure that such providers are not participating in or facilitating, 
directly or indirectly, the evasion of the sanctions regime with respect to Iran or 
violations of the human rights of the people of Iran . . . .”).  See also DIANNE E. 
RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43311, IRAN: U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE 
AUTHORITY TO LIFT RESTRICTIONS 1 (2015) (describing the human rights objectives of 
the sanctions regime). 
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security concerns, Congress and the Executive have imposed exten-
sive sanctions affecting technology, shipping, insurance, oil, bank-
ing, trade, and aid.8 
Sanctions specific to the ICT sector have been imposed to foster 
information and communication to, from, and among Iranian civil-
ians.  They also attempt to curtail censorship, monitoring, and other 
human rights abuses by the Iranian government.  Sanctions accord-
ingly include “sensitive technology” that could be used for censor-
ship and surveillance, including tools that allow the Iranian govern-
ment to block Internet and mobile service access.9  ICT sanctions 
were also imposed to block the transfer of technology in furtherance 
of Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities.10  
2.2. Broad ICT Sanctions 
U.S. sanctions on technology exports to Iran were initially so 
broad that a business journal said they “could encompass every-
thing developed in the computer age.”11  Sanctions prohibited “the 
exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, 
from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever lo-
cated, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran.”12  This included 
a prohibition on the provision of Internet access by U.S. persons to 
Iranians.13 
The United States then exempted information and informational 
materials from the President’s authority to impose sanctions.14  The 
                                                   
8  U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 4; RENNACK, supra note 7, at 1. 
9  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 106(c) 
(“The term ‘sensitive technology’ means hardware, software, telecommunications 
equipment, or any other technology, that the President determines is to be used 
specifically—(A) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in Iran; or (B) to 
disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of the people of Iran.”).   
10  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102. 
11  Clawson, supra note 4, at 86-89 (quoting Vahe Petrossian, Iran Back in the 
Firing Line, 36 MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG. 2, 2 (Dec. 4, 1992)). 
12  Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2009). 
13  Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560 (1991), as interpreted by 
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Guidance on the Provision of Internet Connectivity Services 
(June 3, 2003). 
14  Congress granted the Executive Branch authority to impose sanctions under 
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a). The President has the authority to, “under such regulations as 
he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise—(A) investigate, 
regulate, or prohibit—(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit 
or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/6
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Berman Amendment of 1988 created this carve-out to the Presi-
dent’s authority.15  The Free Trade in Ideas Amendment of 1994 af-
firmed the Berman Amendment, broadened it to apply regardless of 
transmission format, and included examples of new media.16  Under 
the new provisions, the President could no longer regulate the ex-
portation of any information or informational materials, regardless 
of format or commercial character.17 
The purpose of this amendment, according to its sponsor Repre-
sentative Howard Berman, was to “ensure that the President’s 
power to regulate economic relations with foreign countries is not 
used to inhibit communication with the people of those countries.”18  
Since the Iranian government exerts strong control on the media and 
blocks many websites in order to limit the type of information avail-
able to Iranians,19 allowing communication with Iranian civilians in-
creases the sources of independent information inside Iran. 
The United States subsequently eased technology restrictions 
through guidance issued by OFAC in 2003.  The guidance author-
ized the provision of “Internet connectivity services” to Iranian ci-
vilians “on a case-by-case basis by specific license,” provided that 
“the main purpose is to benefit the people of Iran through increased 
access to information” and that “[n]o goods, technology or software 
will be exported, directly or indirectly, to Iran.”20 
In 2006, the Iran Freedom Support Act (“IFSA”) authorized 
spending to assist Iranians dedicated to “democratic values.”21  The 
IFSA authorized the President to “provide financial and political as-
sistance (including the award of grants) to foreign and domestic in-
dividuals, organizations, and entities working for the purpose of 
                                                   
such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national 
thereof, (iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 
1702(a) (2012). 
15  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 
2502(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1371 (1988). 
16  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994). 
17  50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2012). 
18  138 Cong. Rec. 15,052 (1992) (statement of Rep. Berman). 
19  See discussion infra Part 3.3.1. 
20  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Guidance on the Provision of Internet Connectivity 
Services (June 3, 2003). 
21  Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-293, § 302, 120 Stat. 1344, 
1347 (2006). 
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supporting and promoting democracy for Iran.”22  Despite these 
changes, ICT sanctions were still restrictive, creating problems dur-
ing the 2009 Green Revolution.  
2.3. A New Understanding 
The U.S. government came to realize that broad ICT sanctions 
were having the unintended effect of restricting Iranians’ access to 
information and ability to mobilize during the Green Revolution.  
Following controversy over election rigging during the 2009 Iranian 
presidential election, there were a series of protests in Iran.23  During 
these protests, Iranians used mobile devices and social media plat-
forms, particularly Twitter, to communicate with one another and 
organize,24 even though some of these tools were not permitted in 
Iran at the time.25  These tools were so prevalent that the revolution 
                                                   
22  Id. 
23  See generally Abbas Milani, The Iran Primer: The Green Movement, U.S. INST. 
OF PEACE, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-movement (providing an 
overview of the Green Revolution). 
24  See, e.g., Iran and the “Twitter Revolution”, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 25, 
2009), http://www.journalism.org/2009/06/25/iran-and-twitter-revolution (la-
beling the Green Revolution as a “Twitter Revolution” and describing the use of 
social media in aiding the revolution); Lev Grossman, Iran Protests: Twitter, the Me-
dium of the Movement, TIME (June 17, 2009), available at http://con-
tent.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html (discussing the role of 
Twitter in the protests in Iran); Andrew Sullivan, The Revolution Will Be Twittered, 
THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/ar-
chive/2009/06/the-revolution-will-be-twittered/200478 (exemplifying the use of 
Twitter during the protests in Tehran); Patrick Quirk, Iran’s Twitter Revolution, 
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (June 17, 2009), http://www.fpif.org/irans_twitter_revo-
lution (describing the significance of web-based technology and texting in the pres-
idential election of Iran in 2009).  During protests, Twitter stated that it “recognizes 
the role Twitter is . . . playing as an important communication tool in Iran” and 
postponed a routine maintenance shutdown at the request of the U.S. State Depart-
ment.  Brian Bowe, Robin Blom & Eric Freedman, Negotiating Boundaries between 
Control and Dissent: Free Speech, Business, and Repressitarian Governments, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES: TRENDS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF USE 36, 48 (John Lannon & Edward Halpin, eds. 2013).  Contra 
Golnaz Esfandiari, The Twitter Devolution, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 8, 2010) (explaining 
that Twitter usage during Iranian protests was, in fact, for spreading information 
abroad: “There was no Twitter Revolution inside Iran. . . . [G]ood old-fashioned 
word of mouth was by far the most influential medium used to shape the postelec-
tion opposition activity”). 
25  Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2009).  
See also Lee Baker, The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Export Restrictions on Software 
and Online Services for American Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
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was referred to as a “cyberwar” by hardliners.26  In response, the 
Iranian government blocked communications among protesters by 
mandating that mobile and Internet service providers turn off access 
just prior to elections.27  The government blocked access to Twitter, 
Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube.28  Protestors that attempted to doc-
ument events had their cell phones seized and were sometimes even 
arrested.29  The Iranian diaspora in America, which plays a large role 
in facilitating information flows between Iran and the United 
States,30 was not able to provide information to protestors because 
of the government’s actions.31  This made it more difficult for pro-
testors to communicate and organize. 
The Green Revolution illustrated the importance of ICT tools in 
changing the course of a nation’s history.  The United States came to 
understand “that prohibiting citizens in autocratic regimes from ac-
cessing such technology is inimical to the foreign policy objectives 
that animate the U.S. sanctions regime.”32  The State Department rec-
ognized this in its guidance:  “Over the last several years, the world 
has witnessed the important role this technology can assume in 
holding repressive regimes accountable, assisting people in exercis-
ing their human rights and protecting emerging elements of civil so-
ciety.”33 
                                                   
TECH. 537, 539 (2010) (describing the illegality of providing Twitter in Iran as “an 
awkward fact [that] was overlooked”). 
26  Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 48. 
27  See generally Freedom House, Freedom on the Net: Iran (2014), https://free-
domhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2014/iran (describing the Iranian govern-
ment’s attempts to limit information and communication among protestors by fil-
tering websites, disrupting communication services, and blocking circumvention 
tools). 
28  Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 48. 
29  Reporters without Borders, Enemies of the Internet: Countries under Surveil-
lance 19 (Mar. 10, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies.pdf. 
30  Ramin Bajoghli, Diaspora Community (Re)Defined: Hailing Successes, Recog-
nizing Failures, PBS (Dec. 10, 2012, 6:52 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/opinion-
community-redefined-hailing-successes-recognizing-failures.html. 
31  Farnaz Fassihi, Iranian Crackdown Goes Global, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2009, 11:59 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125978649644673331 (describing Iran’s de-
liberate attempts to cut off communications coming in and out of Iran and reciting 
accounts of harassment faced by the Iranian diaspora at the hands of the Iranian 
government). 
32  Baker, supra note 25, at 540. 
33  U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub. Notice 8086, State Department Sanctions Infor-
mation and Guidance (Nov. 8, 2012). 
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2.4. Some Reforms 
Under this new understanding, efforts have been made since 
2009 to ensure that sanctions do not interfere with Iranian civilians’ 
access to ICT tools, while still restricting “sensitive technology” that 
could be used by the Iranian government for censorship and surveil-
lance.  The U.S. government’s strategy changed from allowing com-
panies to apply for specific licenses for technology34 to setting gen-
eral licenses for broader categories of ICT tools.  Technology exports 
authorized under these general licenses attempt to give Iranians ac-
cess to information and protect them from government monitoring 
and censorship. 
The Victims of Iranian Censorship Act of 2009 (“VOICE Act”)35 
aims to increase Iranians’ access to information and shield Iranians 
against censorship attempts by the Iranian government.36  It author-
izes appropriations “for the dissemination of accurate and inde-
pendent information to the Iranian people through radio, television, 
Internet, cellular telephone, short message service, and other com-
munications.”37  In pursuit of this objective, appropriations can be 
used to counter the Iranian government’s efforts to jam radio and 
Internet transmissions and to block short message service (“SMS”) 
text messages.38  However, the VOICE Act did not address the pro-
vision of communication tools by U.S. companies.  The VOICE Act 
also requires the President to report non-Iranian persons, including 
companies, who knowingly or negligently assist the Iranian govern-
                                                   
34  For examples of licenses that were granted, see Licenses Granted to U.S. Com-
panies Run the Gamut, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html?_r=0 (listing licenses that have been 
granted by OFAC, including licenses to Intelsat Global Service and WorldCom to 
provide Iranians with Internet access and provide for the free flow of information 
to and from Iran); Companies With Permission to Bypass Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions-list.html 
(listing licenses that have been granted to “American companies to enter into trans-
actions that would otherwise be prohibited by trade embargoes and sanctions 
rules”). 
35  The VOICE Act was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, 123 Stat. 2190 (Oct. 28, 2009). 
36  Victims of Iranian Censorship Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1263, 123 
Stat. 2190, 2553-54 (2009). 
37  Id. at § 1263, 123 Stat. at 2553. 
38  Id. 
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ment in censuring online information content, blocking communi-
cations, or monitoring online activities.39  However, it does not stip-
ulate enforcement mechanisms against identified persons. 
The stated objective of the VOICE Act is to “aid the ability of the 
Iranian people to – (1) gain access to and share information; (2) ex-
ercise freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of as-
sembly through the Internet and other electronic media; (3) engage 
in Internet-based education programs and other exchanges between 
Americans and Iranians; and (4) counter efforts – (A) to block, cen-
sor, and monitor the Internet; and (B) to disrupt or monitor cellular 
phone networks or SMS text exchanges.”40  President Obama has 
stated that the VOICE Act is part of “U.S. efforts to ensure the free 
flow of information to Iran and to enhance the abilities of Iranians 
to exercise their universal rights.”41  Former Secretary of State Hil-
lary Clinton has said, “[W]e believe it’s critical that [the Internet’s] 
users are assured certain basic freedoms. Freedom of expression is 
first among them. . . .  Blogs, emails, social networks, and text mes-
sages have opened up new forums for exchanging ideas, and created 
new targets for censorship.”42 
OFAC thereafter amended sanctions regulations to authorize the 
exportation of ICT tools without a specific license.43  OFAC issued 
the General License Related to Personal Communication Services in 
2010, authorizing Internet-based personal communication ser-
vices.44  It allows “[t]he exportation from the United States or by U.S. 
persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of services incident to 
the exchange of personal communications over the Internet . . . pro-
vided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the 
                                                   
39  Id. 
40  Id. at § 1263, 123 Stat. at 2553-54. 
41  Barack Obama, Letter from the President Regarding Victims of Iranian Censor-
ship Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/letter-president-regarding-victims-iranian-censorship-act. 
42  Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Internet Freedom, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/eng-
lish/texttrans/2010/01/20100121142618eaifas0.6585352.html#ixzz2nreByiQR. 
43  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License Related to Personal Communication 
Services (2010) (authorizing “[t]he exportation from the United States or by U.S. 
persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of services incident to the exchange 
of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and 
email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blog-
ging, provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the user”). 
44  Id. 
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user.”45  This includes services like “instant messaging, chat and 
email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web brows-
ing, and blogging.”46  The License incorporates elements of a bill in-
troduced by Representative Moran to “support the democratic aspi-
rations of the Iranian people by enhancing their ability to access the 
Internet and communications services.”47 
Soon after, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”) was passed in recognition 
that the black market had given Iran access to sensitive dual-use 
technologies.  CISADA imposes financial restrictions and attempts 
“to prevent the diversion of sensitive dual-use technologies to 
Iran.”48  It defines “sensitive technology” as “hardware, software, 
telecommunications equipment, or any other technology, that the 
President determines is to be used specifically— (A) to restrict the 
free flow of unbiased information in Iran; or (B) to disrupt, monitor, 
or otherwise restrict speech of the people of Iran.”49 
The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 
(“ITRSHRA”) adds new measures and procedures to the sanctions 
regime.  It imposes sanctions on persons that knowingly transfer or 
facilitate the transfer of technologies that are likely to be used by the 
Iranian government to commit human rights abuses, including 
“sensitive technology.”50  It also imposes sanctions on persons who 
engage in censorship or other activities that limit Iranian civilians’ 
freedom of expression or access to information.51 
The Interpretive Guidance of 2012 issued by OFAC attempts to 
provide clarifications to encourage U.S. corporations to provide ICT 
products to Iranians.52  It lists illustrative, non-exhaustive examples 
                                                   
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Iranian Digital Empowerment Act, H.R. 4301, 111th Congress (2009). 
48  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-195, § 3, 124 Stat. 1312, 1315 (2010). 
49  Id. at § 106, 124 Stat. at 1336. 
50  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
158, § 402, 126 Stat. 1214, 1252 (2012).  The Act codified Executive Order 13606, 77 
Fed. Reg. 24571 (Apr. 22, 2012). 
51  Id. at § 403, 126 Stat. at 1254. 
52  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Pol-
icy on Internet Freedom in Iran (Mar. 20, 2012).  That same day, President Obama 
said, “Because of the actions of the Iranian regime, an electronic curtain has fallen 
around Iran - a barrier that stops the free flow of information and ideas into the 
country, and denies the rest of the world the benefit of interacting with the Iranian 
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of products and services, including those that involve the transfer of 
money, that can be exported to Iran from the United States or from 
U.S. persons under the 2010 General License.53  OFAC wanted to 
“ensure that the sanctions on Iran do not have an unintended 
chilling effect on the ability of companies to provide personal com-
munications tools to individuals in that country.”54 
OFAC issued General License D in May 2013 to implement 
broader authorizations for personal communications hardware, 
software, and services.  The license was issued in advance of the 
June 2013 presidential election in Iran.55  It came amidst reports that 
the Iranian government had created a unit dedicated to surveilling 
social networking websites and was slowing Internet connection 
speeds.56  Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman denounced the 
Iranian government’s censorship as “a deliberate and unrelenting 
level of repression in the lead-up to these elections.”57  Referring to 
the Iranian government’s efforts to block access to the Internet and 
the United States’ subsequent reform of the sanctions regime, a sen-
ior U.S. government official told the Wall Street Journal, “There’s 
been an increasing trend in their efforts in new and ever-more-com-
plex and villainous ways to crack down on the free flow of infor-
mation using sophisticated methods, and this is a response to their 
                                                   
people, who have so much to offer.”  Barack Obama, Remarks of President Obama 
Marking Nowruz, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 20, 2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/20/remarks-president-
obama-marking-nowruz. 
53  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Pol-
icy on Internet Freedom in Iran (Mar. 20, 2012). 
54  Id. 
55  Danielle Kehl, Tim Maurer & Sonia Phene, Translating Norms to the Digital 
Age: Technology and the Free Flow of Information under U.S. Sanctions, NEW AM. FOUND. 
12 (Dec. 4 2013), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3872-translating-
norms-to-the-digital-age/Translating_Norms_to_the_Digital_Age_Fi-
nal.7d2eb446318f4534b87a5b7a38c4bfc3.pdf (recounting the Iranian government’s 
“elaborate” attempts to censor,  monitor, and hinder Internet communications  in 
advance of June 2013 elections).  See also Steptoe & Johnson LLP, OFAC Issues Gen-
eral License Authorizing the Export to Iran of Services, Software, and Hardware Incident 
to the Exchange of Personal Communications (June 4, 2013), http://www.step-
toe.com/publications-8856.html (contextualizing the issuance of General License 
D). 
56  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 12. 
57  Agence France-Presse, State Department Official Denounces ‘Repression’ in 
Lead-up to Iranian Presidential Election, RAW STORY (May 5, 2013), http://www.raw-
story.com/rs/2013/05/15/state-department-official-denounces-repression-in-
lead-up-to-iranian-presidential-election. 
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efforts.”58  As such, General License D’s apparent goal was to pro-
vide Iranians greater access to ICT tools prior to the election. 
General License D allowed the exportation of “fee-based ser-
vices incident to the exchange of personal communications over the 
Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social network-
ing, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging,” 
“fee-based software . . . that is necessary to enable [these] services” 
for which OFAC did not provide examples, and “consumer-grade 
Internet connectivity services and the provision, sale, or leasing of 
capacity on telecommunications transmission facilities (such as sat-
ellite or terrestrial network connectivity) incident to personal com-
munications.”59 
Most recently in 2014, General License D-1 replaced and clarified 
General License D.60  While it maintains the same authorizations for 
fee-based services, fee-based software, and consumer-grade Internet 
connectivity services, it resolved ambiguity surrounding the term 
“U.S. persons” in General License D.61  General License D, by its 
plain meaning, limited its authorization to U.S. persons and prohib-
ited the exportation of products with U.S. component parts by non-
U.S. companies from outside the United States.62  General License 
D-1 clarified that non-U.S. persons that have licensed components 
produced in the United States can also export technology to Iran.63 
Since General License D-1 was issued, OFAC has updated its fre-
quently asked questions (“FAQs”) website.64   However, OFAC has 
not issued subsequent interpretive guidance clarifying what exactly 
                                                   
58  Ian Sherr, Apple Eases Restrictions on Selling Products Headed to Iran, WALL ST. 
J. DIGITS BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/dig-
its/2013/08/27/apple-eases-trictions-on-selling-products-headed-to-
iran/?mod=WSJBlog. 
59  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D with Respect to the Exportation and 
Reexportation of Certain Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to the Ex-
change of Personal Communications (2013). 
60  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain Services, 
Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (2014). 
61  Id. 
62  Danielle Kehl, U.S. Government Clarifies Tech Authorizations under Iranian 
Sanctions, NEW AM. FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/us-
government-clarifies-tech-authorizations-under-iranian-sanctions. 
63  Id. 
64  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, http://www.treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx#gld1 (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2015) (answering questions regarding Iranian General License D-1). 
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would be allowed, as it did following the General License of 2010.  
This results in ambiguity that acts as a barrier for companies consid-
ering doing business in Iran. 
The JCPOA, which was finalized with Iran in July 2015, will lift 
sanctions related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.65  This will 
have little impact on the ICT sector.  The U.S. government “retains 
the authority to continue imposing sanctions under other authori-
ties, such as those used to combat terrorism, destabilizing regional 
activity, and human rights violations.”66  Furthermore, there is little 
chance that these sanctions will be removed anytime soon.  Treasury 
Secretary Jacob Lew remarked, “[D]eal or no deal, we will continue 
to use all our available tools, including sanctions, to counter Iran’s 
menacing behavior.  Iran knows that our host of sanctions focused 
on its support for terrorism and its violations of human rights are 
not, and have never been, up for discussion.”67  In fact, the U.S. gov-
ernment continues to vigorously enforce and has even expanded 
these sanctions since reaching the agreement.68  Therefore, the ICT 
sanctions regime imposed against Iran due to its human rights vio-
                                                   
65  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Guidance Relating to the Continuation of Certain Tem-
porary Sanctions Relief Pursuant to the JPOA Prior to Implementation of the 
JCPOA (Aug. 7, 2015). 
66  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 1.  For further reading, see KATZMAN, supra 
note 4, at 1 (detailing the implications of JCPOA); Zachary Laub, International Sanc-
tions on Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 15, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/iran/in-
ternational-sanctions-iran/p20258; Elizabeth Whitman, What Sanctions against Iran 
Won’t Be Lifted? Bans for Terrorism Support, Human Rights Abuses to Remain Intact, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 14, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/what-sanc-
tions-against-iran-wont-be-lifted-bans-terrorism-support-human-rights-abuses-
2008066 (detailing the limitations of sanctions reform). 
67  Jacob Lew, Remarks of Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew to the Washington Insti-
tute, WASHINGTON INST. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtoninsti-
tute.org/policy-analysis/view/remarks-of-treasury-secretary-jacob-j.-lew. 
68  For example, from the signing of the Joint Plan of Action (“JPOA”)—an in-
terim agreement reached in November 2013—through the following year, the U.S. 
government “has sanctioned nearly 100 individuals and entities that were helping 
Iran evade [U.S.] sanctions, aiding Iranian nuclear and missile proliferation, sup-
porting Iranian-sponsored terrorism, or carrying out Iran-related human rights 
abuses.”  Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Status of Talks and the Role of Congress: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of David S. 
Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Dep’t of 
Treas.). 
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lations will remain in place for the foreseeable future.  Certain rep-
utational risks of doing business in Iran will be reduced69 but huge 
risks remain for ICT companies. 
3. RESPONSES AND EFFECTS OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME 
The effect of the ICT sanctions regime has been to impede ICT 
companies from doing business in Iran due to the legal, reputa-
tional, and financial risks involved.  Therefore, Iranian civilians do 
not have access to crucial ICT tools, and their freedoms have been 
restricted.  As a result, the U.S. government’s intentions behind ICT 
sanctions have been undermined. 
3.1. ICT Sector Decision Making 
3.1.1.  Legal Risks 
Before analyzing ICT responses to the sanctions regime, it is of 
primary importance to understand how ICT companies make deci-
sions.  There are several considerations ICT companies have when 
deciding how to respond to sanctions laws.  For one, companies face 
legal risks in deciding whether to do business in countries where 
sanctions are imposed like Iran.  
Companies face a lot of uncertainty about the sanctions regime.  
Sanctions regulations are incredibly complicated and vague.  They 
cover a wide range of activities and contain vague terms like “sup-
port,” “significant,” and “facilitate.”70  This creates ambiguity for 
companies as to what technology can and cannot be legally exported 
to Iran.71  Additionally, sanctions regulations are frequently evolv-
ing.  Companies find it difficult to predict the future shape of the 
sanctions regime,72 and therefore it is difficult for companies to form 
                                                   
69  See infra Part 3.1.2 and Part 3.1.3 for a discussion of reputational risks and 
financial risks of doing business in Iran. 
70  See Edward Krauland & Anthony Rapa, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Iden-
tifying and Managing Secondary Sanctions Risks Arising from Commercial Relationships 
with Iran, 15 BUS. L. INT’L 3, 5 (Jan. 2014) (arguing that these terms create uncertainty 
and therefore business risks for companies). 
71  Id. 
72  See, e.g., J. Triplett Mackintosh & Jeremy Paner, Iran Sanctions and Compliance 
Challenges Going Forward, HOLLAND & HART LLP (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.hol-
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business plans and strategies.  ICT companies that provide services 
and software face unique risks in this atmosphere of uncertainty.  By 
the nature of the online presence of the services they provide, ICT 
companies might find it easier to block access to their services en-
tirely rather than risk failing to adequately block access. 
Even one small misstep could create substantial legal liability, 
and the penalties for infringement are severe.  Criminal violations 
of federal sanctions may result in fines of up to $1 million and im-
prisonment for up to twenty years.73  Civil penalties may result in 
fines of up to either $250,000 or an amount twice that of the illegal 
transaction.74  Violators could have their U.S. assets frozen and be 
prohibited from making financial transactions subject to the juris-
diction of the United States, excluding them from the lucrative U.S. 
market.75  The track record of criminal and civil penalties actually 
faced by companies for violating the sanctions regime has been 
                                                   
landhart.com/iran-sanctions-and-compliance-challenges-going-forward (“The na-
ture of the negotiations, domestic and international politics, and other factors make 
difficult any reasonable prediction as to the shape of future of U.S. sanctions.”). 
73  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 1. 
74  Id. 
75  See, e.g., Mackintosh & Paner, supra note 72 (advising companies on penal-
ties arising from doing business with entities on the specially designated nationals 
list, including asset freezes and market exclusion); Nick Pearson & John Fusco, Re-
insurers Pressed for Compliance with Iran Sanctions, LOCKE LORD LLP (Aug. 2013), 
www.lockelord.com/reinsurers-pressed-for-compliance-with-iran-sanctions-08-
01-2013 (counseling reinsurers that violating sanctions might result in them being 
precluded from the U.S. market, being prohibited from entering into financial trans-
actions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and having their property 
and interests blocked, the net effect of which will prevent violators from transacting 
in the United States). 
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great.76  Furthermore, CISADA permits U.S. state and local govern-
ments to prohibit certain investment activities relating to Iran, ex-
posing companies to additional legal risks and liability.77 
Moreover, parent companies, subsidiaries, and executives are 
exposed to risks for the actions of affiliate entities.78  Persons that 
know or have reason to know of prohibited activities committed by 
any person they control are liable.79  An entity must also disclose 
                                                   
76  For example, in 2012, HSBC paid $1.9 billion for sanctions violations after it 
did business with customers in Iran, Libya, Sudan, Burma, and Cuba.  Aruna 
Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in Money-Laundering 
Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-
hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211.  In July 2014, BNP Paribas pled guilty to 
criminal charges of violating Iran sanctions, in addition to sanctions against Cuba 
and Sudan.  It agreed to fire individuals associated with the violations and accepted 
that it would be unable to clear certain transactions in U.S. dollars for one year.  
Additionally, BNP Paribas settled for $9 billion with U.S. prosecutors, making it the 
largest settlement ever for such a case.  Jonathan Watson, BNP Paribas Sanctions Case 
Highlights US Power over International Deals, 68(5) IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 4, 4 (Oct. 
2014), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?Arti-
cleUid=37e22907-4a88-4a68-bbe2-52117734279e. 
77  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-195, § 202, 124 Stat. 1312, 1342 (2010).  The N.Y. Department of Financial 
Services has been very active on this front and has entered into settlements with 
companies for violating N.Y. banking laws related to federal sanctions compliance, 
including settlements with Standard Chartered Bank for $340 million, Bank of To-
kyo Mitsubishi-UFJ for $250 million, and Deloitte Financial Advisory Services for 
$10 million.  Meredith Rathbone, New York DFS Looks at Non-U.S. Reinsurers’ Com-
pliance with Iran Sanctions Law, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/as-
sets/htmldocuments/Rathbone%20-%20WorldECR%20issue%2024.pdf. 
78  See Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Expansion of the Iran Sanctions 
Act of 1996 and Other New Sanctions and Legal Provisions Relating to Iran (Aug. 11, 
2010), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/7/8/786/081110_Expan-
sion_of_the_Iran_Sanctions_Actof1996.pdf (advising clients that the amended def-
inition of “person” expands liability to financial institutions and the amended def-
inition of “knowingly” expands liability for parent companies); Krauland & Rapa, 
supra note 70, at 6-7 (detailing the risk exposure in cases where parent companies 
should have known about sanctionable conduct and subsidiaries knowingly partic-
ipate in sanctionable conduct); Shearman & Sterling LLP, New US Economic Sanc-





nancial institutions of risks imposed by sanctions laws on the basis of what they 
knew and should have known). 
79  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102. 
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instances of prohibited activity by any affiliates.80  Knowledge in-
cludes instances where a person has “actual knowledge” or “should 
have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.”81  What 
a parent company “should have known” has been left intentionally 
vague, leaving companies unsure of how much oversight and con-
trol is required.82 
In order to ensure compliance with sanctions laws, companies 
doing business in Iran need to have robust controls in place.  The 
due diligence required is such a massive undertaking that compa-
nies must determine whether they are able to “produce, maintain 
and retrieve evidence of such due diligence.”83  This includes having 
internal policies transparent to all employees, routinely assessing 
policies to ensure alignment with legal changes, routinely screening 
against the specially designated nationals (“SDN”) list,84 having pro-
cedures in place for dealing with existing contracts with persons 
added to the SDN list, and maintaining records in order to file any 
necessary disclosures if a violation is found and an investigation 
needs to be conducted.85  Such robust legal compliance controls add 
costs for companies considering doing business in Iran.  Given the 
complexities and costs, ICT companies tend to be extremely adverse 
                                                   
80  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
158, § 219, 126 Stat. 1214, 1235 (2012). 
81  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 101. 
82  Alexandra Anderson, Good Grief! Iran Sanctions and the Expansion of American 
Corporate Liability for Non-U.S. Subsidiary Violations under the Iran Threat Reduction 
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 125, 143 (2013). 
83  David Savage & Kate Hill, The Iran Threat Reduction Act—Insurers and Rein-
surers Beware, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=5b232505-d27a-48d3-b5b3-1805b09d180d. 
84  The SDN list includes persons—individuals and entities—with whom U.S. 
persons are generally prohibited from dealing.  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Specially Desig-
nated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.treas-
ury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf. 
85  See, e.g., Bill Wansley, Don Pressley & Carla Duy, Iran Sanctions Compliance, 
BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Iran-Sanctions-
FS-eng.pdf (“[W]hen dealing with the possibility of covert Iranian activities, tradi-
tional due diligence is insufficient.”); Mackintosh & Paner, supra note 72 (advising 
companies to maintain compliance controls that address U.S. sanctions and prevent 
individuals from facilitating trade with Iran); Pearson & Fusco, supra note 75 (de-
scribing the extensive compliance program reinsurers should have in place); 
Rathbone, supra note 77 (listing information the N.Y. Department of Financial Ser-
vices requested from about 20 non-U.S. reinsurers about their compliance with the 
Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012). 
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to the legal risks of doing business in Iran and often decide not to do 
business in the sanctioned country.86 
3.1.2.  Reputational Risks 
Companies also face reputational risks in determining whether 
to do business in Iran.  Iran’s government has a reputation within 
the United States of being repressive,87 and companies that do busi-
ness in Iran consequently risk being perceived by Americans as aid-
ing a repressive government.  An example of the risks that would be 
involved comes from a company that did business in Egypt during 
the Arab Spring, a time when Egypt was also reputed to have a re-
pressive government.88  That company, Vodafone, in 2011 complied 
with the Egyptian government’s request to shut down its network 
and disconnect Egyptians from the Internet and mobile services.89  
Vodafone also handed over data on Egyptians during anti-govern-
ment strikes and protests.90  However, Vodafone had pushed back 
                                                   
86  See, e.g., Danielle Kehl & Tim Maurer, Confusing Sanctions Are Aiding Gov-
ernment Repression, SLATE (May 30, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.slate.com/arti-
cles/technology/future_tense/2013/05/confusing_sanctions_are_keeping_im-
portant_technologies_from_iranian_activists.html (noting companies that have 
opted out of doing business in Iran or have pulled their business out of Iran because 
of associated legal risks); Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 18 (“[C]ompanies 
take a risk averse approach and often continue to withhold their products until they 
receive additional explicit authorization in the form of interpretive guidance or spe-
cific licenses.”). 
87  Roughly seven out of ten Americans hold an unfavorable view of Iran.  
Eighty-three percent believe that the Iranian government does not respect the rights 
and freedoms of its citizens, which hurts the country’s image.  Global Views of Iran 
Overwhelmingly Negative, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/11/global-views-of-iran-overwhelmingly-
negative. 
88  Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, New Threats, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 3, 
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/07/03/net-threats (surveying experts 
who describe Egypt as having a repressive regime that attempts to control infor-
mation in the face of protests). 
89  Telco Hall of Shame: Vodafone, ACCESS (Jan. 29, 2013, 12:39 PM), 
https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2013/01/29/hall-of-shame-vodafone. 
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against the government’s requests and only complied after the gov-
ernment threatened to use its own “off switch.”91  Additionally, Vo-
dafone was transparent to the public about the situation.  It updated 
its privacy policy to acknowledge the tensions it faced between its 
obligation to follow host country laws and its desire to protect users’ 
rights to privacy and freedom of expression.92  It also invited NGOs 
to its Egyptian operations in January 2012 to observe the issues that 
Vodafone employees faced in dealing with government demands.93  
Despite all this, it received significant backlash from the public.94  
Vodafone exposed itself to reputational risks simply due to the na-
ture of doing business in Egypt. 
Another illustrative example comes from Yahoo! in 2009.  Mi-
chael Samway, former Vice President and Deputy General Counsel 
of Yahoo!, was on his way to Singapore when a fake news story 
broke out claiming that he was stopped in Iran and forced to disclose 
information on Yahoo! users.95  Even though the story was false, the 
news spread quickly, alarming Yahoo! users.96  Yahoo! posted state-
ments regarding the situation and clarified that no Yahoo! repre-
sentative had communicated with the Iranian government and that 
Yahoo! had not disclosed information on its users to the govern-
ment.97  A Yahoo! statement noted, “The power of the Internet 
means that information travels quickly, including claims that are 
false.”98  This story illustrates how even non-dealings with Iran are 
fraught with public perception risks.  News travels fast, and it is dif-
ficult to repair reputational damage after news spreads, even if that 
                                                   
91  James Glanz & John Markoff, Egypt Leaders Found ‘Off’ Switch for Internet, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/technol-
ogy/16internet.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all&. 
92  Privacy – Activity in 2011/12, VODAFONE (2012), http://www.voda-
fone.com/content/index/about/sustainability/sustainability_report/is-
sue_by_issue/privacy/activity_in_2011-12.html. 
93  Id. 
94  See, e.g., Telco Hall of Shame: Vodafone, supra note 89 (placing Vodafone in a 
virtual “hall of shame” for its actions in Egypt). 
95  Larry Dignan, Retraction: Yahoo and Iran, ZDNET (Oct. 9, 2009, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/retraction-yahoo-and-iran. 
96  Id. 
97  Nicki Dugan, No Yahoo! Meeting in Iran, YODEL (Oct. 9, 2009, 5:11 PM), 
https://yodel.yahoo.com/blogs/yahoo-emea/no-yahoo-meeting-iran-2826.html; 
Michael Samway, Iran Stories, YAHOO! BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM BLOG 
(Oct. 9, 2009, 7:47 PM), http://yahoobhrp.tumblr.com/post/74887134903/iran-
stories. 
98  Samway, supra note 97. 
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news is proven false.99  As a result, companies tend to be extremely 
careful in this space. 
Furthermore, after the U.S. government’s “concerted campaign” 
cautioning companies of the consequences of doing business in 
Iran,100 companies see business in Iran as an inherently risky propo-
sition, and it has become difficult for companies to shift their mind-
set to see it as anything but that.  The JCPOA, by easing sanctions, 
slightly de-stigmatizes business activities in Iran and mitigates per-
ceived reputational risks, but reputational risks still abound. 
3.1.3.  Financial Risks 
In addition to reputational concerns, the financial considerations 
of a company wishing to do fee-based business in Iran are immense.  
Because of extremely restrictive financial sanctions, a company 
wishing to do business in Iran would have to find non-SDN banks.  
The banks must be willing to assist with financial transactions in-
volved in the authorized sale of apps and other ICT tools by pro-
cessing payments and clearing transactions, all without debiting or 
crediting accounts within Iran.101  This is a hard task since banks are 
hesitant to assist given the risks involved.102  Banks that are willing 
to bear these risks will likely charge a risk premium, creating addi-
tional costs and making it prohibitively expensive to make these 
transactions. 
                                                   
99  See generally Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, Misinformation and Fact-check-
ing: Research Findings from Social Science, NEW AM. FOUND.  (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/Misinformation_and_Fact-checking.pdf 
(summarizing social science research on misinformation, which says misinfor-
mation spreads easily and is difficult to correct). 
100  Peter Feaver & Eric Lorber, Penalty Box, FOREIGN AFF. (June 6, 2014), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-06/penalty-box 
(explaining the risks associated with U.S. companies doing business in Iran). 
101  Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 560.516(a) (2010) 
(“United States depository institutions are authorized to process transfers of funds 
to or from Iran, or for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Govern-
ment of Iran, if the transfer . . . does not involve debiting or crediting an Iranian 
account . . . [and] arises from an underlying transaction that has been authorized 
by a specific or general license issued pursuant to this part . . . .”). 
102  See, e.g., George Lopez & David Cortright, Financial Sanctions: The Key to a 
'Smart' Sanctions Strategy, 72 DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE 327, 329 (1997) (“Banks are 
acutely sensitive to uncertainty and the perception of risk, and they may be reluc-
tant to make commitments in nations facing financial sanctions.”). 
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These issues drive down the risk reward for companies, as they 
drive up the risk relative to the reward of entering Iran.  The risks 
associated with transactions is especially severe for app transac-
tions, which involve thousands of small payments, compared to 
transactions for more expensive products that involve larger, infre-
quent transactions like laptops and operating systems.  Since it is 
difficult to find legal banking channels to Iranians and the penalties 
of unintentionally violating sanctions are serious, “there is little in-
centive for companies to export fee-based goods and services.”103 
3.2. ICT Sector Responses 
3.2.1.  Social Media Tools 
With these considerations and risks in mind, several ICT com-
panies have responded to sanctions changes in a limited fashion.  
Companies are understandably hesitant to do business in Iran, even 
after the easing of sanctions.104  With regard to social media tools, 
Twitter has been made available to Iranians.  The Iranian govern-
ment blocks Twitter, but Iranians can access Twitter using virtual 
private networks (“VPNs”), although these too are technically ille-
gal under Iranian law.105  However, Iranians do not have access to a 
key security feature:  they cannot enable two-factor authentication 
with Twitter because they cannot add their Iranian cellphone num-
bers.106  This makes it less secure for Iranians using Twitter and 
makes advocacy efforts more vulnerable insofar as Twitter accounts 
are made more susceptible to hacking.  Twitter has not commented 
on why Iranian cellphone numbers cannot be added to enable this 
key security feature.  Facebook too has been made available to Ira-
nians but must be accessed through a VPN because of Iranian gov-
ernment censors.107 
                                                   
103  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 19-20. 
104  See Feaver & Lorber, supra note 100 (explaining the risks that would be 
associated with U.S. companies doing business in Iran). 
105  Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Twitter Adds Iran, Cuba and 20 Other Coun-
tries to Location Options, MASHABLE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://masha-
ble.com/2015/01/27/twitter-iran-cuba. 
106  Id. 
107  Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Bars Social Media Again after a Day, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
17, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/mid-
dleeast/facebook-and-twitter-blocked-again-in-iran-after-respite.html. 
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3.2.2.  Instant Messaging, Telecommunication, and Video 
Communication Tools 
Communication tools have generally been made available in 
Iran, but the use of some tools has been restricted.  Google Hangout 
is available in Iran.108  In 2009, Yahoo! purchased Maktoob, an Arab 
Internet services company, and a web version of Yahoo! Messenger 
has since been permitted.109  The use of Yahoo! Messenger on mobile 
devices is restricted, however.  It requires SMS verification for reg-
istration, whereby a four-digit code is sent to one’s mobile phone 
which must then be put into the service for verification.110  However, 
Iran has not been included in the list of authorized SMS codes.111  
Yahoo! has not publicly explained the reasoning for its approach. 
3.2.3.  App Stores 
App stores have blocked access in Iran in whole or in part be-
cause of the financial transactions involved with many apps.  Some 
companies have unblocked parts of their mobile app stores in Iran 
in response to General License D, but limitations still remain.  Since 
August 2013, Apple has made App Store apps available for sale by 
third parties.112  Apple updated its export compliance page and in-
formed users that “[s]ome Apple goods and Apple software fall into 
these categories,” referring to the categories of authorized goods 
and services in General License D.113  Apple again acknowledged, 
referring to General License D-1, that “[s]ome Apple goods and Ap-
ple software fall into these categories.”114  With this statement, Ap-
ple is saying that a third party that sells Apple apps in Iran would 
                                                   
108  Collin Anderson, Chart of Services Denied Due to Sanctions (Aug. 2014), 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nhCRNnKtT-
Klkya9dMP9jvyL1H_Onu0nOetugq_8aUSs/edit#gid=0. 
109  Jeffrey Ghannam, Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings 
of 2011, CENTER FOR INT’L MEDIA ASSISTANCE (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CIMA-
Arab_Social_Media-Report-10-25-11.pdf. 
110  Anderson, supra note 108. 
111  Id. 
112  Apple, Global Trade Compliance, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/le-
gal/more-resources/gtc.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
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not violate its vendor agreement.  However, Apple is not directly 
offering apps there. 
The Google Play Store has been made available in Iran, begin-
ning in August 2013.115  However, it is “currently available only for 
free apps and not for priced apps or apps that use in-app billing.”116  
Also, availability requires action by developers, who must click the 
opt-in button for availability in Iran.117  Google has not publicly ex-
plained why it is limiting its activity in Iran.  The company is likely 
acting based on the financial risks involved with offering for-pay 
apps. 
Some Iranians are able to bypass restrictions to access digital 
goods, but this is limited to the technologically savvy.  For example, 
Iranians trying to directly access Apple’s digital sale of music, vid-
eos, and software through its iTunes and App Stores will see a “1009 
error message,” which indicates that that service to the country has 
been blocked.118  Iranians can bypass the block by using VPNs, reg-
istering Apple accounts with addresses outside Iran, and using for-
eign gift cards.119  However, since black market goods are expensive 
and bypassing registration restrictions requires substantial technical 
knowledge,120 black market goods and services are only available to 
the wealthy and technologically savvy. 
                                                   
115  Android Developers, #AndroidDev, GOOGLE PLUS (Aug. 26, 2013), 
https://plus.google.com/u/0/+AndroidDevelopers/posts/YCHtLJMXkYo (an-
nouncing, “Developers, starting today you can make your free apps available in 
Iran.”).  See also, Frederic Lardinois, Android Developers Can Now Use Google’s Play 
Store to Distribute Their Free Apps in Iran, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/26/android-developers-can-now-use-googles-
play-store-to-distribute-their-free-apps-in-iran (discussing the implications of 
Google’s announcement). 
116  Android Developers, supra note 115. 
117  Id. (“To add this country to your distribution, please visit the Pricing & 
Distribution page in the Developer Console and select the checkbox for Iran di-
rectly.”). 
118  Marcus George, Insight: Despite Sanctions, Apple Gear Booms in Iran, REUTERS 
(July 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/us-apple-iran-
idUSBRE86C0AY20120713. 
119  Id. 
120  See Sallar Kaboli, What U.S. Really Did to Us Iranians, MEDIUM (Feb. 5, 2014), 
https://medium.com/@sallar/what-u-s-really-did-to-us-iranians-ac1b0ee5b621 
(detailing the methods Iranians must use to access U.S. services and software). 
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3.2.4.  Cloud Computing and Educational Platforms 
Some cloud computing platforms that host websites have 
blocked incoming connections from Iran for every website they host 
due to uncertainty about what is permissible.  For example, Google 
App Engine blocks incoming connections from Iran.121  This means 
that educational platforms that Google App Engine hosts, like Khan 
Academy,122 are also blocked within Iran, preventing Iranians from 
accessing useful educational tools.  Coursera, another educational 
platform, has itself blocked access to Iran due to sanctions re-
strictions.123  It explains, “Under the law, certain aspects of 
Coursera’s course offerings are considered services and are there-
fore subject to restrictions in sanctioned countries . . . .”124  Coursera 
had previously allowed connections to its service from Iran, acting 
under an interpretation of “unclear” export regulations that led the 
company to believe that sanctions allow educational platforms like 
Coursera.125  It recently received information that its interpretation 
was not in line with sanctions law and started blocking incoming 
connections from Iran to come into compliance with sanctions.126  
Iranians are therefore deprived from access to the many massive 
open online courses available through Coursera.  GoDaddy has re-
cently started allowing incoming connections from Iran for websites 
it hosts, beginning in December 2013.127  
                                                   
121  Collin Anderson, Sanctions: Reverse Filtering, GITHUB (June 8, 2012), 
https://github.com/collina/Internet-Freedom-Repository/wiki/Sanctions:-Re-
verse-Filtering-%28%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1-
%D9%85%D8%B9%DA%A9%D9%88%D8%B3-%29; Anderson, supra note 108. 
122  Khan Academy, The Khan Academy Scales and Simplifies with Google App En-
gine (2011) https://cloud.google.com/files/KhanAcademy.pdf. 
123  Coursera, Update on Course Accessibility for Students in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 
Syria (Jan. 28, 2014, 8:22 PM), http://blog.coursera.org/post/74891215298/update-
on-course-accessibility-for-students-in. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  GoDaddy, TWITTER (Feb. 27, 2014, 9:59 PM) https://twitter.com/Go-
Daddy/status/439278639944060928 (“@NIACouncil Glad you noticed.  Since Dec. 
'13, Iran residents have been able to access and browse websites hosted with us. cc: 
@pooriast ^S”).  See also Pooria Asteraky, GoDaddy Stopped Sanctions Against #Iran, 
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3.2.5.  Products 
Some products have been restricted in Iran due to the risks in-
volved in doing business there.  Nokia “ceas[ed] all revenue gener-
ating activities” ”due to the difficult business environment and in-
creasing restrictions on doing business in Iran.”128 
Apple has adopted a similar approach.  Apple will not sell its 
products directly in Iran.129  However, Apple will sell to individuals 
who plan to sell to Iranians or take products into Iran.130  An Apple 
spokesperson said, “Apple is no longer banned from selling Macs 
and iOS devices to customers who plan to bring or send those prod-
ucts to Iran” as a result of OFAC’s issuance of General License D.131 
Despite their legality, there have been misunderstandings about 
sanctions regulations, which have restricted the sale of Apple prod-
ucts to Iran.  In 2012, an Apple store in the United States, misunder-
standing U.S. sanctions laws, refused to sell an iPad to a Persian 
speaker.132  The State Department spokeswoman subsequently is-
sued a statement clarifying that “there is no U.S. policy or law that 
prohibits Apple or any other company from selling products in the 
United States to anybody who’s intending to use the product in the 
United States.”133 
Some goods are available on the black market in Iran but their 
availability is often in violation of U.S. sanctions law.  Additionally, 
black market goods have not been made widely available enough to 
reach the masses.  For example, Iranian merchants are able to source 
Apple products through underground trade routes and transit 
points in the Middle East, such as Dubai or Turkey, although ille-
gally.134  However, these are subject to additional duties and ship-
ping fees, and Iranian customs for these goods range from 4% for 
portable products to 60% for larger components.135  Prices increase 
                                                   
128  Kehl & Maurer, supra note 86. 
129  Sherr, supra note 58. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. 
132  Jillian York, Can Apple Refuse to Sell a Laptop to an Iranian Citizen? Maybe, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 21, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/06/can-apple-refuse-sell-laptop-iranian-
citizen-maybe. 
133  Id. 
134  George, supra note 119. 
135  Id. 
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with these additional costs and the scarcity of black market goods, 
making these products only available to the wealthy elite.  Iranians’ 
access to these technologies is consequently limited to a small, well-
resourced subset of the population. 
Across services, software, and products, ICT companies have 
been cautious to enter Iran.  The current complexity that companies 
face explains their concern.  
3.3. Effects of Sanctions 
3.3.1.  Harm to Iranians 
The result of the sanctions regime and the ICT sector’s limited 
response to reforms has been to harm Iranians and impede the 
United States’ stated goals.136  Sanctions in general can be “blunt in-
struments” that “cause substantial collateral damage to the popu-
lace at large.”137  “[P]olicy makers overestimate their ability to cali-
brate and control these tools of economic statecraft,” and the 
narrative that the U.S. government can calibrate sanctions to the pre-
cision of a “silver bullet” is incorrect.138  Sanctions can have substan-
tial unintended effects on the general populace in sanctioned coun-
tries.139 
The sanctions regime against Iran imposes too many risks for 
companies to justify doing business in Iran.  As a result, companies 
have failed to provide Iranian civilians with important ICT tools that 
they need to mobilize, including technology that allows civilians to 
                                                   
136  Sanctions have failed to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals with respect to 
empowering Iranians to mobilize and challenge their government.  In other ways, 
sanctions have fulfilled foreign policy goals.  Sanctions have hurt Iran’s economy, 
thereby impeding Iran’s ability to support terrorism and acquire and develop 
weapons.  See Clawson, supra note 4, at 92-95 (laying out some consequences of 
sanctions, including reduced oil sales, a collapse in the value of Iranian currency, 
and reduced access to foreign capital).  But see Clawson, supra note 4, at 94-95 (ar-
guing that sanctions have failed to achieve U.S. stated objectives and have not per-
suaded Iran to change its behavior because Iran thinks the “price is acceptably low.” 
Iran believes it can acquire necessary financing and technology from other coun-
tries, and its “radical foreign policy does much to puff up Iranian nationalist 
pride”). 
137  GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & 
BARBARA OEGG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 138 (3d ed. 2009). 
138  Peter Feaver & Eric Lorber, The Sanctions Myth, 138 NAT’L INT. 22, 22-23 
(July 2015). 
139  HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 137, at 138. 
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spread information, communicate with one another, and counter 
government censorship.140  Alternative tools available to Iranians 
are often less secure, leaving Iranians more vulnerable to govern-
ment monitoring.141  Sanctions have therefore harmed Iranians. 
Providing Iranians with ICT tools remains important as the Ira-
nian government continues to censor communications and repress 
the civil and political rights of Iranians.142  The Iranian National Cen-
ter for Cyberspace decides which websites should be blocked and 
the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology exe-
cutes Iran’s filtering policies.143  The Iranian government censors 
roughly five million websites.144  This includes websites that the 
government deems immoral and websites expressing dissenting 
and independent views.145  Some of these are filtered, greeting users 
with a message from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
that the website has been blocked; others are shut down altogether, 
presenting the user with nothing at all.146  Many Iranians wishing to 
circumvent the government’s censorship use tools such as proxies 
and VPNs:  roughly 69.3% of Iranian youths that use the Internet use 
                                                   
140  This practice has been referred to as “reverse filtering.”  Reverse filtering 
is “the application of American Treasury sanctions to deny services to Iranian users, 
generally identified by their IP address.  Despite revisions to the law, made March 
8 2010, extending a general license for information services and software to non-
government users, misapplications and ambiguity continues to unnecessarily fetter 
Iranians.”  Anderson, supra note 121. 
141  See id.  (“[I]ndividuals receive software updates and [pirated] software in 
markets and through media passed along, increasing their exposure to spyware 
and other security issues.  For Iran to have a safe Internet, capable of securely sus-
taining activism, these unfounded prohibitions must end.”). 
142  See Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 37 (classifying Iran’s govern-
ment as “repressitarian” because it is “repressive in terms of human rights practices 
and authoritarian in terms of governance”). 
143  Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Blocks Way to Bypass Internet Filtering System, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/03/12/world/middleeast/iran-blocks-software-used-to-bypass-
internet-filtering-system.html?_r=0. 
144  U.N. Secretary General, Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/26 (Feb. 20, 2015). 
145  OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Iran (June 16, 2009), https://open-
net.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Iran_2009.pdf. 
146  See Hamid Farokhnia, A Kafkaesque Realm of Cyber Censorship, PBS 
FRONTLINE TEHRAN BUREAU (May 9, 2010, 12:12 AM), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/a-kafka-
esque-realm-of-cyber-censorship.html#ixzz3ZILSJXvF (differentiating govern-
ment censorship done through “filtering” with that done through “shutting 
down”). 
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circumvention tools.147  However, the Iranian government also 
blocks Iranians’ attempts to bypass its censors.148 
In addition to censoring and blocking access to certain websites 
altogether, the Iranian government slows, or “throttles,” Internet 
connection speeds to certain other websites.149  This renders web-
sites nearly unreachable but draws less attention and is less detect-
able.  As such, this practice is harder to combat and is an effective 
way for the government to curb freedom of information and expres-
sion.  The Iranian government also imposes restrictions on the press, 
further limiting independent information.150 
While President Rouhani is more moderate and has talked of lift-
ing or reducing Internet censorship, it is unclear how much influ-
ence he has, as ultimate power still lies with Supreme Leader 
Khamenei.151  President Rouhani has been able to strike common 
ground with Khamenei to secure faster and more reliable Internet 
                                                   
147  Mahsa Alimardani, Nearly 70% of Young Iranians Use Illegal Internet Circum-
vention Tools, GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://advo-
cacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/09/16/nearly-70-of-young-iranians-use-illegal-
internet-circumvention-tools. 
148  Erdbrink, supra note 143 (describing the Iran Ministry of Information and 
Communications Technology’s efforts to block software used by Iranians to bypass 
the government’s Internet censors). 
149  Collin Anderson, Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism 
of Censorship in Iran 24 (Cornell University, Working Paper No. 1306.4361, 2013) 
(analyzing data to identify periods during which the Iranian government at-
tempted to throttle the Internet); Mahsa Alimardani, Iran's Internet Users Outsmart 
Government in Cat-and-Mouse Censorship Game, GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY (Aug. 12, 
2014), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/08/12/irans-internet-users-
outsmart-government-in-cat-and-mouse-censorship-game (describing the govern-
ment’s attempts to throttle encrypted Internet traffic, including through anonymity 
tools like Tor). 
150  See Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 42-43 (detailing the methods 
by which the Iranian government restricts free press, including by monopolizing 
broadcast facilities, fining newspapers, closing newspapers, revoking press li-
censes, and imprisoning journalists).  Iran ranks 173 out of 180 countries in the Press 
Freedom Index.  Reporters without Borders, Press Freedom Index 2015, https://in-
dex.rsf.org.  It ranks 190 out of 197 in the Freedom House Ranking.  Freedom 
House, Freedom of the Press 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/freedom-press-2014.  Reporters without Borders called Iran “one of the 
cyber-censorship’s record-holding countries.”  Reporters without Borders, supra 
note 29, at 18. 
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speeds for Iranians.152  He has also expressed disfavor for Internet 
censorship and has spoken of the need to provide the technological 
needs of the youth, stating, “[W]e will have to do it tomorrow. If not, 
the day after tomorrow.”153  However, just days after President Rou-
hani acknowledged that government filters are ineffective, the Min-
istry of Culture and Islamic Guidance blocked additional news web-
sites.154  Also, social media networks like Facebook and Twitter 
remain blocked.155 
3.3.2.  Failure to Achieve U.S. Goals 
In addition to harming Iranians, sanctions have failed to achieve 
U.S. foreign policy goals.  Sanctions are “designed to coerce the lead-
ers of the targeted regime to change policies.”156  Some might claim 
that sanctions have been effective at achieving U.S. goals in Iran, as 
sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy, strained the Iranian gov-
ernment, and therefore given the United States enough leverage to 
exert diplomatic pressure and recently formulate the JCPOA of July 
2015.157   
However, sanctions are generally less effective against non-
democratic regimes like Iran where ultimate power lies with the Su-
preme Leader.  In non-democratic systems, people have less power 
to change their government’s policies in response to pressure from 
sanctions.158  Sanctions that attempt to change government policies 
                                                   
152  Azadeh Moaveni, Iran: Rouhani’s Insistence on Faster Internet has Staying 
Power, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.indexoncensor-
ship.org/2014/09/iran-rouhani-internet-3g-4g-supreme-leader-ali-khamenei. 
153  Id. 
154  Alimardani, supra note 147. 
155  Id. 
156  HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 137, at 138. 
157  Matthew Levitt & Peter Crail, Can Sanctions Be Effective in Halting Iran's 
Nuclear Program?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 19, 2007), 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/can-sanctions-effective-halting-irans-nuclear-pro-
gram/p14500. 
158  See David Lektzian & Mark Souva, An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset 
and Success, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 848, 849 (2007) (arguing that sanctions are 
less effective against nondemocratic target countries where sanctions allow the gov-
ernment to extract greater rents and do not result in political costs for the govern-
ment because the larger populace, which bears the burden of the sanctions, is not 
part of the government’s political coalition); Susan Hannah Allen, The Domestic Po-
litical Costs of Economic Sanctions, 52 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 916, 918 (2008) (sum-
marizing scholarship that posits the ineffectiveness of sanctions in nondemocratic 
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have such an effect only to the extent that the harm provokes the 
population to pressure their government to change; but this is un-
likely to occur if the government is not incentivized to respond to 
the people’s demands.159  Additionally, where a country is able to 
form a nationalistic narrative about sanctions, sanctions “can also 
defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic response against 
the international community . . . and by rallying the population be-
hind the leaders whose behavior the sanctions are intended to mod-
ify.”160 
A chief objective of the ICT sanctions regime is to support Ira-
nian civilians’ freedom of information and communication and to 
counter human rights abuses perpetrated by the Iranian govern-
ment.  Since the 2009 Iranian election, U.S. sanctions have attempted 
“to support the ability of the domestic opposition in Iran to com-
municate, to reduce the regime’s ability to monitor or censor Inter-
net communications, and to sanction Iranian officials that commit 
human rights abuses.”161  Reforms have been undertaken in recog-
nition of the importance of ICT tools to these goals.162  Sanctions laws 
attempt to promote communications among Iranian civilians.  
CISADA creates an exemption for technology that helps Iranians 
communicate and access the Internet.163  The General License of 2010 
                                                   
countries, where social suffering is not translated into political costs for the govern-
ment). 
159  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 5. 
160  U.N. Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of 
the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 
U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (Jan. 25, 1995). 
161  KATZMAN, supra note 4, at 28. 
162  See U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub. Notice 8086, State Department Sanctions Infor-
mation and Guidance (Nov. 8, 2012) (“The United States government supports ef-
forts to facilitate the free flow of information and freedom of expression in Iran . . . 
and is cognizant of the vital importance of providing technology that enables the 
Iranian . . . people to freely communicate with each other and the outside world. . . 
.  [T]he Iranian . . . government[] ha[s] taken steps to restrict the free flow of infor-
mation and freedom of expression over their networks, to track and monitor the 
communications of their people for the purpose of perpetrating human rights 
abuses, or to disrupt networks in support of military operations against their own 
people.”). 
163  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-195, § 103, 124 Stat. 1328 (2010). 
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allows free personal communications services,164 and General Li-
cense D-1 adds authorizations for fee-based ICT services and prod-
ucts.165  Sanctions also aim to counter the Iranian government’s cen-
sorship of the Internet.  CISADA prohibits the U.S. government from 
contracting with foreign companies that sell Iran sensitive technol-
ogy that could be used to monitor or censor information and com-
munications.166  Executive Order 13606 bans U.S. trade with persons 
determined to be operating or selling technology that enables the 
Iranian government to disrupt or monitor computer usage of civil-
ians.167  ITRSHRA sanctions persons that support Iran’s efforts to 
censor or throttle the Internet,168 and Executive Order 13628 blocks 
the property of such persons.169  In doing so, ITRSHRA restates that 
a goal of sanctions is to counter Iran's efforts to violate the human 
rights of Iranians.170   
Despite this goal, the U.S. sanctions regime has failed to provide 
Iranian civilians with the ICT tools necessary to support independ-
ent information, communication, and mobilization.  Many im-
portant ICT goods and services remain unavailable or restricted in 
Iran,171 impeding an important goal of the United States’ ICT sanc-
tions regime against Iran.  The to-date lack of effectiveness and harm 
to Iranians resulting from sanctions demonstrate a need for reform. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1. Government 
There are several steps that need to be taken by the U.S. govern-
ment, ICT companies, and civil society in order to improve the sanc-
tions regime and bring it in line with U.S. interests and Iranians’ 
                                                   
164  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License Related to Personal Communication 
Services (2010). 
165  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain Services, 
Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (2014). 
166  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 106. 
167  Exec. Order No. 13606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24571 (Apr. 22, 2012). 
168  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-158 § 403, 126 Stat. 1214, 1254 (2012). 
169  Exec. Order No. 13628, 77 Fed. Reg. 62139 (Oct. 9, 2012). 
170  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 101, 126 Stat. at 1217. 
171  See supra Part 3.2 for an analysis of ICT tools that are unavailable or have 
only been made available on a limited basis. 
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freedoms.  The U.S. government should target sanctions, implement 
authorizations, issue reports, create financial routes, and make in-
formation more transparent. 
4.1.1.  Targeted Sanctions 
The U.S. government should further target sanctions.  In a 2013 
report by the New America Foundation, Danielle Kehl, Tim Maurer, 
and Sonia Phene suggest that the sanctions regime should be more 
targeted.172  Ideally, targeted sanctions “focus on groups of persons 
responsible for the breaches of the peace or the threats to interna-
tional peace and security,” but “leav[e] other parts of the population 
and international trade relations unaffected.”173 
U.S. sanctions are already highly targeted, but further targeting 
would maximize the negative impact on the Iranian government 
while minimizing the negative impact on the general population.174  
Targeting sanctions can include targeting specific actors and sectors 
of the economy and creating exemptions for humanitarian goods 
and services.175  These approaches tend to increase the effectiveness 
of sanctions regimes compared to comprehensive sanctions.176 
The approach that has been taken with humanitarian exceptions 
to sanctions177 should be applied to ICT sanctions.  In the late 1990s, 
there was an increase in humanitarian authorizations.178  Sanctions 
regimes with humanitarian exemptions generally have carve-outs 
for food, medicine, and medical devices.179  The approach that was 
                                                   
172  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 17. 
173  Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, Peter Romaniuk, Aaron Halegua & 
Natalie Reid, Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation, 
THOMAS J. WATSON, JR. INST. FOR INT’L STUD. vi (2001). 
174  See Daniel W. Drezner, How Smart are Smart Sanctions?, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 
107, 107 (2003) (summarizing literature on smart sanctions and underlying the im-
portance of a good understanding of the target state’s domestic political economy). 
175  Robin Geiss, Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call 
for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-Up Assessment of 
Long-Term Effects, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 167, 183 (2005). 
176  Id. at 183-89. 
177  For more on humanitarian exemptions, see id. at 186 (“Generally speaking, 
humanitarian exemption clauses exclude certain categories of goods—typically, 
food and medical supplies—from the sanctions regime.”). 
178  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 6. 
179  Food and medicine were previously subject to a specific licensing program 
under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A-67 (2000).  OFAC issued general licenses authorizing 
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applied to humanitarian aid in the 1990s should be applied to the 
ICT sector. 
This approach is starting to be applied to the ICT sector already 
with the post-2009 reforms.180  It should continue to be applied and 
should be applied with greater force and breadth.  Despite recent 
progress, Iranians are still having difficulty accessing communica-
tions tools.181  The U.S. government should target ICT sanctions to 
restrain trade for only those technologies that are likely to be abused 
by the Iranian government in a way that would threaten interna-
tional peace and security.  This would ensure that Iranians have ac-
cess to communications tools that allow them to gain information 
and organize political activity. 
4.1.2.  Authorizations 
The exportation of ICT services and products should be regu-
lated through authorizations, not exemptions.  Sanctions regimes 
can include exemptions and authorizations.182  Both enable certain 
goods and services to be exported to sanctioned countries, but they 
differ in the way they achieve this goal.183  Exemptions restrict U.S. 
agencies from preventing the exportation of particular goods and 
services, regulating on these issues, and issuing informational ma-
terials.184  Authorizations, on the other hand, allow U.S. agencies to 
regulate these issues, grant licenses for the exportation of goods and 
services that would have otherwise been prohibited under sanc-
                                                   
their sale.  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License (2012) (authorizing the exportation 
and reexportation of medicine and basic medical supplies); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 
General License (2011) (authorizing the exportation and reexportation of food 
items); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Clarifying Guidance: Humanitarian Assistance to Iran 
(Aug. 14, 2012) (clarifying that food and medicine donations are broadly authorized 
and do not require specific licenses). 
180  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 6. 
181  See examination supra Part 3.2 (reviewing ICT tool unavailability). 
182  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 6. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
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tions, update and change the scope of these licenses, and enact pen-
alties against infringers.185  The United States has used authoriza-
tions for humanitarian assistance, issuing temporary authorizations 
for disaster relief aid.186 
Granting ICT availability through authorizations as opposed to 
exemptions would grant U.S. agencies greater flexibility to respond 
to changes.  Agencies would be more readily able to continue issu-
ing interpretations and updates.  It would also provide ICT compa-
nies with greater certainty:  authorizations contain explicit language 
about what companies can export, while exemptions leave more to 
interpretation.  There is a risk that authorizations could lead to some 
uncertainty; general licenses issued by OFAC can also be revoked 
by OFAC.  However, OFAC can mitigate this uncertainty by reas-
suring major ICT companies through outreach.187 
4.1.3.  Reporting 
The U.S. government should couple authorizations with report-
ing requirements.  This would be similar to reporting guidelines for 
investments in Burma.188  The U.S. government should require com-
panies that want to enter Iran to report to the U.S. government on 
their activities.  As is done with investments in Burma,189 such re-
porting should include information on human rights policies and 
procedures, payments to Iranian entities, property acquisitions, and 
risk prevention and mitigation practices. 
This would allow the U.S. government to track the role that com-
panies are playing in Iran and assess the effectiveness of the sanc-
tions regime.  It would balance the government’s objectives in 
providing ICT tools to facilitate information and communication 
while addressing concerns about the exploitation of such tools by 
the Iranian government.  In doing so, it would allow for broader 
                                                   
185  Id. 
186  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License No. 2 (2006) (adding a new general 
license authorizing transactions in the business conduct of international organiza-
tions). 
187  See discussion infra Part 4.1.5 (discussing information transparency). 
188  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License No. 17 (2012); U.S. Dep’t of State, Re-
sponsible Investment Reporting Requirements (May 23, 2013), http://www.human-
rights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/responsible-investment-reporting-re-
quirements-final.pdf. 
189  Id. 
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general licenses for ICT tools in Iran and make it easier for compa-
nies to do business there while still giving the government more 
oversight.  There is a risk that reporting requirements would deter 
companies from doing business in Iran if companies begin to view 
these requirements as too burdensome.  However, the reporting re-
quirements are likely to be small relative to the gains to be earned 
from entering the largely untapped market. 
4.1.4.  Financial Routes 
It is also important that OFAC facilitate financial aspects of the 
ICT sector opening.  As mentioned above, financial restraints create 
additional risks for companies and dissuade them from entering 
Iran.190  Some Iranians are able to obtain fee-based ICT tools by using 
foreign credit cards or by “gifting,” but these solutions are not scal-
able or viable in the long term since they are only feasible for a 
wealthy subset of the population.191  The JCPOA mitigates some of 
these issues, but several concerns remain.  OFAC has so far only 
taken small steps to respond to civil society concerns and foreign 
policy objectives.  It has not eased financial restraints along with its 
easing of restraints on ICT goods and services.  It needs to take fur-
ther steps to facilitate the availability of ICT tools.  OFAC did this in 
relation to financial restraints on the delivery of humanitarian aid 
by creating humanitarian aid exceptions for financial transactions.192  
Similarly, OFAC should create financial routes for the ICT sector in 
order to facilitate the exportation of personal communication goods 
and services. 
4.1.5.  Information Transparency 
The U.S. government, through the Treasury, State, and Com-
merce Departments, should make information more available and 
                                                   
190  See discussion supra Part 3.1.3 (discussing the financial risks for compa-
nies). 
191  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 19-20 (examining the processing of 
financial transactions). 
192  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Clarifying Guidance: Humanitarian Assistance and 
Related Exports to the Iranian People (Feb. 6, 2013) (clarifying that financial insti-
tutions are permitted to process financial transactions necessary to facilitate the 
trade of humanitarian exports to Iran and financial transactions in support of trade 
in certain food, medicine, and medical devices from the United States). 
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transparent in order to clarify sanctions laws to companies.  Alt-
hough OFAC has answered some questions related to General Li-
cense D-1 through the FAQs section of its website,193 OFAC should 
frequently update answers to FAQs about the license. 
Furthermore, OFAC should offer further interpretive guidance 
on permissible actions, as it did after the General License of 2010.  
Guidance should include information on the distinction between 
“personal” and “commercial” ICT.  General License D-1 “does not 
authorize . . . [t]he exportation or reexportation, directly or indi-
rectly, of web-hosting services that are for commercial endeavors or 
of domain name registration services.”194  The license does not make 
it clear whether websites that are mainly used for personal commu-
nications but also allow commercial transactions would be covered 
under existing licenses.195  Web-hosting companies also face a lot of 
uncertainty about what websites they can permissibly host.  For ex-
ample, during the 2013 elections in Iran, U.S. web-hosting company 
Just Host shut down the website of a candidate.196  To remedy this 
ambiguity, OFAC should issue interpretive guidance defining “per-
sonal” and should offer examples of permissible goods and services. 
OFAC should also conduct periodic outreach efforts with large 
and mid-sized ICT companies to routinely inform them about recent 
changes in sanctions laws.  This is especially important since inter-
pretive guidance has not been issued since General License D-1 was 
set.  OFAC should likewise reach out on the financial side to large 
and mid-sized banks to clarify how the changes impact financial 
transactions.  This is crucial for true and sustainable success on the 
                                                   
193  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., OFAC FAQs: Iranian General License D-1, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (answering questions regarding Iranian General License 
D-1). 
194  U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain Services, 
Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (Feb. 7, 2014) (em-
phasis added). 
195  Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 20 (discussing the difference be-
tween personal and commercial communications technology). 
196  Just Host shut down Mehdi Karoubi’s website, telling him that the com-
pany could no longer host his website www.karroubi.ir.  The company cited U.S. 
sanctions laws for the action, stating, “This sanction extends to include the country-
code top level domains .IR, .SY, .KP, and .CU (Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba).”  
Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. Sanctions Force Closure of Opposition Leader’s Website, REUTERS 
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ICT side.  Banks need to understand what is legal and what sanc-
tions reform mean for them in order to feel comfortable assisting ICT 
companies in making their technologies available. 
Such guidance, interpretations, and outreach efforts would mit-
igate the risk that a company’s interpretation of sanctions laws 
might differ from that of the government’s.  This is a problem that 
frequently arises, as a sanctions attorney explains:  general license 
authorizations are “open authorizations subject to interpretation.”197  
“[C]ompanies construe them broadly to try to justify every conceiv-
able transaction they want to engage in with the sanctioned coun-
try.”198  However, “the U.S. Government construes the general li-
censes narrowly in order to prevent the stretching of such 
authorizations to those transactions which it actually doesn’t want 
to be covered but for which the general authorization could conceiv-
ably extend to.”199  As a result of this discrepancy, companies “can 
easily be held liable . . . if they do not fully comprehend or guess 
OFAC’s intention correctly.”200 
The U.S. government should make information transparent to 
American civil society as well.  This is a worthy goal because an in-
formed civil society can appropriately compel the U.S. government 
to reform the sanctions regime and pressure U.S. companies about 
their business practices.  Already, the Iranian diaspora in the United 
States and other concerned U.S. persons have played an active role 
in foreign policy discussions by lobbying Congress, publishing arti-
cles, and speaking to think tanks in order to bring about change in 
the sanctions regime.201 
To achieve information transparency, the U.S. government, in-
cluding the Treasury, State, and Commerce Departments, should 
publish information about the impact that sanctions has on civilians 
in sanctioned countries.  The U.S. Department of State publishes an-
nual human rights reports on the human rights practices of various 
                                                   
197  Erich Ferrari, OFAC General License D: Is the “D” for Deceiving?, SANCTION 
LAW, (Sept. 20, 2013), http://sanctionlaw.com/ofac-general-license-d-is-the-d-for-
deceiving (recounting his experience as a sanctions attorney with companies under 
investigation by OFAC). 
198  Id. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  See discussion infra Part 4.3.1 (discussing civil society advocacy). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
802 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
 
countries.202  Reports could incorporate information about the effect 
sanctions have on civilians’ human rights. 
The U.S. government should also incorporate human rights rat-
ings into existing reports, rating companies based on the impact 
their practices have on the human rights and freedoms of individu-
als in those countries.  These assessments could be based on the ICT 
sector guide put forth by the European Commission.203  The ratings 
should include top ICT companies, both those that do and do not do 
business in Iran.  Companies that chose not to do business in Iran or 
block authorized services and products in Iran should lose points:  
this would mitigate the risk that companies would refrain from do-
ing business in Iran out of fear that they might receive a low rating 
relative to other companies doing business in Iran. 
Furthermore, there needs to be information transparency to in-
form Iranians about U.S. sanctions and counter any misinformation 
from the Iranian government.  This would allow Iranians to appro-
priately pressure their government for reform.  The U.S. government 
is already making social media outreach efforts to Iranians.  The U.S. 
State Department’s Persian language spokesperson Alan Eyre dis-
cusses sanctions through his Twitter account and through inter-
views with Iranian newspapers.204  President Obama creates a video 
on YouTube annually for Iranians also explaining sanctions.205  
While there is no U.S. embassy in Iran, there is a virtual embassy 
that explains U.S. policy.206  There is also a U.S. satellite radio pro-
gram, Voice of America, which provides news, including explana-
tions of sanctions, in English and Farsi among other languages.207  
These efforts should become more frequent and be available on 
more platforms to reach more people. 
                                                   
202  An example of these reports can be found at U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of 
Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Iran 2014 Human Rights Report (2014) (reporting on the 
Iranian government’s human rights practices). 
203  See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ICT SECTOR GUIDE ON IMPLEMENTING THE 
UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011) (detailing methods 
of achieving human rights compliant business practices). 
204  Alan Eyre, @AlanEyre1, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/AlanEyre1 (last vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2015). 
205  The White House, President Obama's Nowruz Message to the Iranian People, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-g2nZ5-4AlY. 
206  VIRTUAL EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES, http://iran.usembassy.gov (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
207  VOICE OF AMERICA, http://www.voanews.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
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4.2. Companies 
4.2.1.  Making the Case to Companies 
To get companies to export ICT tools to Iran, the ICT sector 
needs to be persuaded to do business in Iran.  There are several rea-
sons ICT companies should enter Iran.  First, there is a strong busi-
ness case for entry.  Iran is a large and nearly untapped market.  It 
has a sizable population of eighty million people, the second largest 
in the Middle East and seventeenth largest in the world.208  Iranians 
are highly educated, and they are engaged technology and Internet 
users.209  Internet usage among the population has steadily increased 
from 8.1% in 2005, to 15.9% in 2010, and to 39.4% in 2014.210  The 
percentage of individuals using the Internet is almost five times 
what it was in 2005.  Iran has a largely literate population of 89.4%.211  
It also has a big youth population:  the median age is 28.3,212 and 
over 60% of the population is under thirty years old.213  About 23.5 
million youth use the Internet.214  Despite restrictions imposed by 
the Iranian government, Iranians are still active online.  In early 
2009, there were about 60,000 blogs routinely updated in Iran.215  Ira-
nian youth “gravitate towards the Internet to avoid cultural and po-
litical obstacles in their lives and expectations to follow social 
                                                   
208  Majid Rafizadeh, Doing Business with Post-Sanctions Iran: Risks and Oppor-
tunities, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/doing-business-with-post_b_7960484.html. 
209  World Bank, Iran, Islamic Rep. (2015), http://data.worldbank.org/coun-
try/iran-islamic-republic.  See also Behrang Tajdin, Will Iran’s National Internet Mean 
No World Wide Web?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22281336 (discussing the Iranian 
government’s initiative to create a nationwide intranet and setting out the popula-
tion’s ingenuity in accessing the Word Wide Web). 
210  World Bank, Internet Users (per 100 People) (2015), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2. 
211  U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2015), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html. 
212  Id. 
213  Rafizadeh, supra note 208. 
214  Alimardani, supra note 147. 
215  John Kelly & Bruce Etling, Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture 
in the Persian Blogosphere, HARVARD UNIVERSITY BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND 
SOCIETY (Apr. 2008), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.har-
vard.edu/files/Kelly&Etling_Mapping_Irans_Online_Public_2008.pdf. 
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norms.”216  Additionally, NGOs in Iran that would like to use ICT 
tools to advertise to and educate Iranians on human rights issues 
would provide a market for companies. 
ICT companies that enter Iran would gain a competitive ad-
vantage.  They would benefit from being some of the first companies 
to enter Iran and would gain the opportunity to dominate the mar-
ket.  They would also avoid risks associated with not entering Iran 
early, namely being left behind and being pressured by competitors 
that make money off of their activity in Iran.  Companies would also 
benefit from reciprocal effects, such as family and friends of Iranians 
hearing about the technology their Iranian acquaintances are using 
and going on to use the same technology.  Likewise, U.S. companies 
should do business in Iran to place them on equal footing with com-
panies in other nations that will surely be taking advantage of the 
emerging market.217 
Second, there is an ethical case to be made to companies.  Many 
ICT companies have great size, power, and reach.  By entering Iran, 
these companies can use their power to facilitate communication 
among Iranians and make a positive impact in Iran.  Crowdsourced 
information from social media websites provides an opportunity to 
spread information during protests.218  Non-Iranian reporters were 
severely restricted during the 2009 elections, and so they had to rely 
on Iranians posting information on social media websites.219  Addi-
                                                   
216  Ali Asghar Kia, Iranian Youth Online: Identity between Traditional and Modern 
Lifestyles, COMMUNITY BROADCASTING ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://www.cbaa.org.au/article/iranian-youth-online-identity-between-tradi-
tional-and-modern-lifestyles. 
217  Eric Lorber & Elizabeth Rosenberg, Dollar Diplomacy in Tehran, FOREIGN 
AFF. (July 14, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-07-
15/dollar-diplomacy-tehran (encouraging U.S. companies to enter Iran to “ensure 
that Iran’s new commercial relationships do not pivot exclusively to Asia”). 
218  Jessica Heinzelman & Patrick Meier, Crowdsourcing for Human Rights Mon-
itoring: Challenges and Opportunities for Information Collection and Verification, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES: TRENDS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF USE, supra note 24 at 123, 129 (arguing that traditional human 
rights reporting faces challenges of capacity, cost, and access that crowdsourcing 
can solve). 
219  See, e.g., Steve Herrmann, Social Media in Iran, BBC (June 16, 2009, 12:51 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/legacy/theeditors/2009/06/social_me-
dia_in_iran.html (explaining BBC’s reasons for monitoring social media during the 
2009 protests, including to counteract heavy restrictions placed on foreign journal-
ists in Iran and based on a desire to follow the “huge ongoing, informed and in-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/6
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tionally, increased access to U.S. products and services would in-
crease security.  Individuals in sanctioned countries are forced to use 
alternative communication tools, which are often less secure than 
products made in the United States.220  Alternatives are more vul-
nerable to government surveillance and interference, putting activ-
ists at risk.221  The contribution that ICT companies can make toward 
advancing Iranians’ freedoms might even be noticed by U.S. con-
sumers, who might go on to buy their products as a result. 
Third, companies should be persuaded by the reputational ef-
fects of doing business in Iran.  Just as doing business in Iran can 
create reputational risks, failing to enter Iran can also provoke neg-
ative press.  Entering Iran in a way that improves Iranians’ freedoms 
can create positive press for companies, which might in turn inspire 
U.S. consumers to buy their goods and services. 
Fourth, there is a legal case to be made.  Corporate social respon-
sibility (“CSR”) is an expanding area of law.  Increasingly, domestic 
and international legal regimes have expanding CSR laws.222  Com-
panies should see CSR laws as something they can get ahead of and 
use to their advantage.  By ensuring CSR compliance, companies can 
improve their bottom line and lower reputational and legal costs 
from non-compliance. 
                                                   
formative discussion in Iran between people who care deeply about what is hap-
pening there and who are themselves monitoring everything they can, then circu-
lating the most useful information and links”); Heinzelman & Meier, supra note 218, 
at 128-129 (“[D]uring Iran’s ‘Twitter Revolution,’ CNN’s David Mattingly stated in 
one news case, ‘Because Western journalists are not allowed to cover these events, 
we are looking at the social networking sites and seeing what’s posted on there.’”). 
220  See Anderson, supra note 121 (describing how tools available to Iranians 
“increas[e] their exposure to spyware and other security issues”). 
221  Sanctions have led to a similar situation in Sudan, where sanctions are also 
imposed.  Sudanese activist Anwar Dafa-alla said of the sanctions, “The U.S. sanc-
tions have empowered the government security agencies against the activists 
online, because there [are] few anonymity tools available for them, and many of 
them are not tech savvy.  Not being able to update your software makes you an 
easy catch for the highly trained security officers.”  Danielle Kehl & Tim Maurer, 
Time to Rethink Tech Sanctions against Sudan, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2014, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/01/sudan_sanc-
tions_are_keeping_secure_communications_tools_from_activists.html. 
222  See John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
Agenda 17-18 (Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 38, June 2007) (chronicling 
the “expanding jurisdictional web” of corporate social responsibility laws and the 
resulting “increased liability risks” that companies face). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
806 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
 
4.2.2.  Leadership 
After ICT companies are persuaded that entering Iran is a valu-
able proposition, there needs to be leadership within companies that 
is willing to make tough decisions and take risks.  Leaders at com-
panies will have to resolve tensions between those that want to take 
advantage of potentially lucrative business opportunities and those 
that want to steer clear of risks accompanying such business oppor-
tunities.  Leaders at companies need to be willing to boldly pursue 
lucrative business opportunities, even when the legal compliance 
costs might tempt leaders to stay away from such opportunities. 
There also needs to be leadership within the industry.  Compa-
nies with the resources to do so should do business in Iran and be 
among the first players in the market.  The ICT sector has had a his-
tory of a lot of interplay:  if one company does something, others 
will soon follow.223  Therefore, companies should lead other compa-
nies in the ICT sector by acting and resultantly persuading others to 
act on the business opportunities in Iran. 
4.2.3.  Consultation 
In addition to leadership, companies within the ICT sector 
should consult with one another in regards to sanctions.  This could 
be similar to other multi-stakeholder initiatives, like the Global Net-
work Initiative.224  The effort should similarly encourage an ex-
change of best practices regarding ways to do business in Iran in a 
                                                   
223  See generally supra Part 3.2. 
224  The Global Network Initiative includes ICT companies (Facebook, Google, 
LinkedIn, Microsoft, Procera Networks, and Yahoo!), eight academic organizations, 
thirteen civil society organizations, and nine investors.  It was established in re-
sponse to “government pressure to comply with domestic laws and policies in ways 
that may conflict with the internationally recognized human rights of freedom of 
expression and privacy” and aims to “protect and advance freedom of expression 
and privacy in the ICT sector” by providing a framework of best practices.  GLOBAL 
NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org (last visited Oct. 
23, 2015).  Of the initiative, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “The ini-
tiative goes beyond mere statements of principles and establishes mechanisms to 
promote real accountability and transparency.”  Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Internet 
Freedom, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.  But see Ronald Deibert & Rafal 
Rohozinski, Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of Cyberspace Security, 4 INT’L POL. 
SOCIOLOGY 15, 26 fn. 7 (2010) (“The effectiveness of such self-regulation is untested 
and still questionable”); Justine Nolan, The China Dilemma: Internet Censorship and 
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human rights promoting manner.  Such an initiative would make 
more hesitant companies more comfortable about entering Iran. 
4.2.4.  Human Rights Assessment 
Once a company enters Iran, it should assess its human rights 
impact to conform to the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, as set out by former U.N. Special Rapporteur for 
Business and Human Rights John Ruggie.225  Under the Principles, 
businesses “should avoid infringing on the human rights of others 
and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they 
are involved.”226  They should “avoid causing or contributing to ad-
verse human rights impacts through their own activities, and ad-
dress such impacts when they occur.”227  These obligations apply 
“regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and 
structure.”228 
Companies should have policies and practices to meet these re-
sponsibilities.229  The policies should indicate expected personnel 
and business partners, indicate procurement practices, set financial 
and performance incentives for personnel, and be made publicly 
available.  Companies should conduct due diligence to identify, pre-
vent, and mitigate human rights impacts, both actual and potential. 
They should also draw on human rights expertise and consult with 
potentially affected groups, such as Iranian protest groups, in order 
to more fully appreciate human rights risks. 
Human rights assessments should be started as early as possible 
after a company enters Iran and should be conducted at regular in-
tervals.  Companies should act upon findings in human rights as-
sessments and track the effectiveness of their responses.  Companies 
                                                   
Corporate Responsibility, 4 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 24 (2009) (“Voluntary codes of conduct 
that aim to delineate corporate responsibility for human rights can aid protection 
of such rights but cannot alone ensure uniform protection.”). 
225  John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), 
Report on Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 
2011). 
226  Id. at 13. 
227  Id. at 14. 
228  Id. at 14. 
229  Id. at 15. 
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should also publicly release information about their practices, in-
cluding information about government requests to restrict infor-
mation and responses to these requests.  Google has done this by 
releasing a transparency report online since 2010.230 
Cloud computing platforms should be transparent with con-
sumers.  They do not always notify new or existing customers about 
their actions.  When GoDaddy was restricting access to Iranians at-
tempting to access websites it hosts, GoDaddy did not inform cus-
tomers.231  It even claims that web hosting “allows people around 
the world to find and view your website,” without exception.232  This 
is a problem because many hosted websites might not know they 
are being blocked by their hosting companies.  Consequently, advo-
cacy and education websites wishing to reach Iranians might not 
know their efforts are being blocked.  Without such information, 
they cannot act appropriately and seek other avenues to reach Irani-
ans.  Although hosting services might not want to inform customers 
that they are blocking websites in Iran and likely receive subsequent 
backlash, these hosting services should do more to notify customers 
by clarifying that websites hosted through them will not be available 
in Iran. 
4.3. Civil Society 
4.3.1.  Advocacy 
There are also several steps civil society should take.  Civil soci-
ety should continue imploring politicians to reform the sanctions re-
gime.  Advocacy has led to the easing and clarification of ICT sanc-
tions in the past:  Iranian political and civil society, concerned about 
Iranians and their Internet freedom, petitioned Congress, published 
articles, and spoke to think tanks.233  The National Iranian American 
                                                   
230  The report includes information about government requests to remove 
content and requests for information about Google users.  Google, Transparency Re-
port, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
231  Pooria Asteraky, Revealing a Hidden Story about GoDaddy’s Hosting, 
POORIAST (Jan. 26, 2013), http://pooriast.wordpress.com/2013/01/26/revealing-a-
hidden-story-about-godaddys-hosting. 
232  GoDaddy, Web Hosting, http://www.godaddy.com/hosting/web-host-
ing-new.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
233  Nat’l Iranian Am. Council, Accomplishments, http://www.niacoun-
cil.org/about-niac/accomplishments (last visited May 5, 2015). 
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Council, for example, conducted campaigns against broad sanctions 
by publishing articles,234 issuing public letters,235 and conducting in-
terviews.236  The organization successfully advocated for the lifting 
of sanctions that impeded the delivery of humanitarian goods and 
services.237  It also successfully advocated for lifting sanctions that 
restricted Iranian civilians’ ability to communicate with one another 
and the outside world.  Its campaigns led to the removal of sanctions 
on online communications tools like MSN Messenger, Facebook, 
and YouTube.238  They also led to the lifting of sanctions on commu-
nications technologies, including hardware like laptops and mobile 
phones, services like VPNs, and anti-malware software.239  Another 
group, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, has also 
tracked and disseminated information about ICT sanctions to put 
pressure on the U.S. government to reform its sanctions.240  Civil so-
ciety can continue to facilitate progress in the sanctions regime by 
continuing to urge politicians to reform the regime. 
                                                   
234  Nat’l Iranian Am. Council, Sanctions, http://www.niacoun-
cil.org/tag/sanctions (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). 
235  29 Organizations Warn Congress Against New Iran Sanctions, NAT’L IRANIAN 
AM. COUNCIL (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.niacoun-
cil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=10061 (posting a letter from the Na-
tional Iranian American Council and twenty-eight other organizations warning key 
Senate members against additional sanctions). 
236  Which Iran Will We Choose?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/archive/segment/which-iran-will-we-
choose/52b8825478c90a4ce600069d (interviewing Reza Marashi, Research Director 
of the National Iranian American Council). 
237  Jamal Abdi, NIAC Applauds Easing of Humanitarian Sanctions on Iranians, 
NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.niacouncil.org/niac-ap-
plauds-easing-of-humanitarian-sanctions-on-iranians. 
238  Phil Elwood, NIAC Efforts to Reform Sanctions on Internet Tools for Iranians 
Successful, NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.niacoun-
cil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5961. 
239  Jamal Abdi, NIAC Applauds Lifting of Communications Sanctions for Iranians, 
NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (May 29, 2013), http://www.niacoun-
cil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9263&security=1&news_iv_ctrl=1261. 
240  See, e.g., Crippling Sanctions, INT’L CAMPAIGN FOR HUM. RTS. IN IRAN (Apr. 
29, 2013), http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/04/crippling-sanctions (ex-
plaining the difficulties suffered by Iran because of sanctions imposed by the 
United States and the European Union). 
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4.3.2.  Information Dissemination  
Civil society should also continue disseminating information on 
the impact that sanctions are having on Iranians’ access to ICT tools.  
Civil society plays an important role in informing and mobilizing 
civilians.  Civil society should continue these efforts by publishing 
information on sanctions regulations and on ICT companies’ prac-
tices within Iran.  This would in turn encourage more people to join 
the cause in lobbying for reforms of the sanctions regime and in 
pressuring companies to react to existing opportunities within the 
sanctions regime. 
Civil society should also incorporate sanctions-related rankings 
into existing ranking projects.  A potential space for such rankings 
is the Ranking Digital Rights Index.241  Rankings could also be added 
to reports like the Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report.242  
The ranking should evaluate companies on the extent to which their 
actions facilitate access to information in regards to sanctions re-
gimes.  With respect to Iran, this should include companies’ willing-
ness to act under General License D-1 and the breadth of their activ-
ities in Iran.  This would be a simple way to inform the public of 
companies’ activities in providing access to information and would 
consequently support public advocacy efforts to effectuate govern-
ment and company policy change. 
These recommendations, if implemented, would ensure that the 
sanctions regime both supports Iranians’ freedoms and furthers U.S. 
foreign policy goals. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Although U.S. ICT sanctions against Iran have not had the in-
tended effect of providing Iranians with access to ICT tools, imple-
mentation of the recommendations above would both improve Ira-
nians’ freedoms and further U.S. interests.  The sanctions regime 
and the resulting responses by the ICT sector have so far had the 
unintended effect of limiting Iranians’ freedoms and leaving them 
                                                   
241  Rebecca MacKinnon, Ranking Digital Rights, RANKING DIGITAL RIGHTS, 
http://rankingdigitalrights.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
242  See, e.g., Freedom on the Net, FREEDOM HOUSE (2014), https://free-
domhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf 
(reporting on Internet freedom by country). 
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vulnerable to censorship and monitoring by the Iranian govern-
ment.  To remedy this, the U.S. government should further target 
sanctions, create more authorizations, ease financial restrictions, 
and increase information transparency.  The government should fol-
low the achievement of the JCPOA with reforms in the ICT space to 
achieve further progress.  ICT companies should respond to sanc-
tions reforms by taking advantage of the business opportunities to 
be gained from exporting their technologies to Iran in a human 
rights compliant manner.  Furthermore, civil society should con-
tinue advocating for necessary reforms of the sanctions regime.  
These steps would have the result of providing Iranians with the 
ICT tools they need to access information, communicate, and mobi-
lize. 
Additionally, lessons learned from the sanctions regime against 
Iran should be applied across all sanctions regimes.  The United 
States should follow these recommendations with respect to the ex-
portation of ICT tools in other sanctioned countries.  There have al-
ready been similar efforts at reform with respect to other countries 
as part of the United States’ effort to support the free flow of infor-
mation and communication worldwide.  Since the 2010 General Li-
cense was issued for Iran, Sudan, and Cuba, a similar policy has 
been applied to Syria.243  Also, OFAC has applied the approach it 
took with General License D to Sudan244 and Cuba.245  Most recently, 
there have been developments authorizing personal communica-
tions tools in the Crimea region of Ukraine to support information 
                                                   
243  General License No. 5 Related to Internet-Based Services was incorporated 
into 31 C.F.R. § 542 (2011) (permitting Internet-based personal communication ser-
vices under the sanctions regime against Syria, provided that such services are pub-
licly available at no cost to the user). 
244  Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538 (2015) (licensing personal 
communications software, hardware, and services). 
245  Definitions found in General License D closely resemble those found in the 
2009 Commerce Department’s Cuban Consumer Communications Devices excep-
tion.  This exception was amended to eliminate the donation requirement in 2015.  
Cuba: Providing Support for the Cuban People, 80 Fed. Reg. 2286 (Jan. 16, 2015) 
(amending sanctions against Cuba to authorize the exportation of items intended 
to strengthen civil society and improve information flows, including the sale of cer-
tain communication tools).  See also Danielle Kehl, Increasing the Free Flow of Infor-
mation to Cuba under U.S. Sanctions, NEW AM. FOUND. (Jan. 22, 2015), 
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/increasing-the-free-flow-of-information-to-
cuba-under-us-sanctions (identifying reforms in sanctions against Cuba as part of 
the U.S. government’s broader efforts to reform comprehensive sanctions and sup-
port information flows). 
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flows.246  This trend should continue to be applied across the world 
and should be extended to fee-based ICT tools.  Such reform would 
support civilians’ access to information and freedom of expression, 
and it would enable civil society in sanctioned countries to organize 
and mobilize against repressive governments. 
 
                                                   
246  U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Russian Sanctions: Revisions and Clarifications 
for Licensing Policy for the Crimea Region of Ukraine (May 22, 2015) (amending 
the Export Administration Regulations to facilitate Internet-based communications 
with persons in the Crimea region of Ukraine); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License 
No. 9 (2015) (authorizing personal communication software that is not fee-based in 
the Crimea region of Ukraine).  See also Danielle Kehl, U.S. Government Authorizes 
the Export of Internet-based Communications Tools to Crimea, NEW AM. FOUND. (May 
26, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/us-government-authorizes-the-ex-
port-of-internet-based-communications-tools-to-crimea (recognizing the im-
portance of the reform for the U.S. government’s efforts in ensuring the free flow of 
information). 
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